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What distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a
shifting Supreme Court majority is the absolutely indispensable
requirement that judicial opinions be grounded in consistently
applied principle. This is what prevents judges from ruling now this
way, now that - thumbs up or thumbs down - as their personal
preferences dictate.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of Justice O'Connor's retirement from the Court, there will
undoubtedly be a flurry of books and articles devoted to the first female

* Professor of Law, Georgia State College of the Law. Versions of this Essay have been
presented at a faculty workshop at American University, and at the 2004 Conference of the
Southeastern Association of American Law Schools. I would also like to thank Sandy Levinson,
Steve Kaminshine, Tom McCoy, Neil Kinkopf and Mark Tushnet for helpful comments on a
previous draft.
1. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2751 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice and her many significant contributions. Her views on such
important and contentious issues as affirmative action, abortion,
federalism, and the separation of church and state often dictated the
Court's resolution of those controversies. For a long time, Justice
O'Connor was unquestionably the most influential judge in America, and
how she did her job had a profound effect on our country. As Jeffrey
"We are all living now in Sandra Day
Rosen has said so accurately:
2
O'Connor's America."
The literature concerning Justice O'Connor will be mostly positive, but
this Essay presents a dissenting view. Justice O'Connor's constitutional
law decisions, taken as a whole, threatened rule of law values. Her
reluctance to articulate principles governing cases, as well as her
inconsistent treatment of legal doctrine, failed to provide enough stability,
predictability, or transparency to differentiate legal rules from personal
preferences. Although she may have been an effective compromiser,
appealing to a cross-section of different constituencies, herjudicial method
led to the exercise of coercive and arbitrary governmental power.
Before I explain what I mean by rule of law standards, and demonstrate
how Justice O'Connor's decisions jeopardized them, a few caveats and
disclaimers are necessary to place my thesis into an appropriate context.
First, my critique will not take issue with, and does not depend upon,
demonstrating the weaknesses of specific results preferred by Justice
O'Connor. This Essay is centered on her method of decision making, not
her substantive vision.
Second, this Essay will be subject to the critique that the Court as a
whole, or at least other Justices,3 also threaten rule of law requirements. I
am a legal realist who is somewhat receptive to the idea that much of the
Court's constitutional law jurisprudence jeopardizes the rule of law.
However, the specific intent of this piece - to make transparent the
undeniable procedural failings of Justice O'Connor's constitutional law
opinions - is a much easier thesis to support.
Related to this potential critique is the problem that many of Justice
O'Connor's opinions this Essay criticizes were joined by other Justices.
How much responsibility U.S. Supreme Court Justices should bear for the
opinions they join, but do not write, is a difficult question that is beyond

2. Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,2001, § 6, at 32. See also Victoria
Ashley, Death PenaltyRedux: JusticeSandraDay O'Connor'sRole on the Rehnquist Court and
the Futureof the Death Penalty in America, 54 BAYLOR L. REv.407, 415 (2002) (her "pragmatic
approach allows her to remain not only at the center of the court, but also at the center of American
politics").
3. Most notable on this list are Justices Kennedy and Breyer.
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the scope of this project. It is fair to suggest, however, that Justice
O'Connor's habit of deciding cases as narrowly as possible, while at the
same time authoring so many opinions lacking in principle, raised more
rule of law questions than the work of other Justices. The fact that other
Justices joined some of her decisions does not weaken this thesis.
My final disclaimers are that the arguments in this Essay do not depend
on a resolution of the recent debate in the Court and academia about the
differences between clear rules and flexible standards, or the similar
debate about the importance of the Court's reliance on precedent. Kathleen
Sullivan has persuasively showed that the rule of law can accommodate
significantly different approaches to the rules/standards controversy.4
Open-ended balancing tests and flexible standards do not, by themselves,
undermine the rule of law. But when the factors used in these tests are
applied by judges mysteriously, and the weights assigned to the various
elements used in the balancing tests are left unexplained, rule of law
problems do emerge. Similarly, much has been written on the benefits and
detriments of strict adherence to precedent,5 and this Essay does not take
a position on that debate, other than to suggest that the rule of law requires
a minimum judicial commitment to treating similar cases similarly.
Part II of this Essay discusses the rule of law and its application to U.S.
Supreme Court cases. Part III details a number of Justice O'Connor's
constitutional law decisions and demonstrates that, collectively, they
threaten rule of law standards. Part IV suggests that Justice O'Connor's
failure is especially significant because she was so often the crucial swing
vote. This Essay concludes that Justice O'Connor's failure to take rule of
law principles seriously infected much of the Court's constitutional law
jurisprudence for over twenty years and provides a poor example of how
U.S. Supreme Court Justices should decide constitutional cases.
II. THE RULE OF LAW

Many academics have suggested that the rule of law is a general
concept not subject to precise definition.6 Although it is true that there are
a variety of different interpretations, there are certain minimum standards
4. Kathleen M. Sullivan, TheJustices ofRules andStandards,106 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedentin ConstitutionalDecision Making
and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV.

571 (1987).
6. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781
(1989); Richard H. Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1997).
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that governments devoted to the rule of law need to satisfy. When applied
to government generally, rather than the courts specifically, the rule of law
requires generality, publicity, clarity, conformability, and prospectivity.7
The laws of the state should be general and separate from specific cases;
they must be publicized so citizens are aware of them; they must be clear
enough to be followed and reasonable enough to allow citizens to conform
to them; and they must be prospective, meaning the rules must exist prior
to the actions which implicate the state's authority.' This is a rather broad
view of the rule of law, and all of these requirements turn on questions of
degree. The general ideas, however, are not controversial. There must be
pre-existing rules which are clear enough to be followed and public
enough to allow compliance.
How these principles apply to U.S. Supreme Court decision making is
more complicated. At the most basic level, a justice who rules for one of
the parties because of a bribe would obviously violate any reasonable
definition of the rule of law. Similarly, a justice who rules for one side
because she wants to benefit from the outcome of the case would be acting
illegitimately, even if there was no communication between the party and
the justice. Further, a justice who rules for a party because of the color of
her skin or her religion would violate the rule of law. I am not suggesting
that Justice O'Connor would, or ever has, decided a case in the ways
mentioned above, but that these examples of decision making demonstrate
that the rule of law is implicated by court decisions.
Odious rules capable of consistent application may also implicate the
rule of law. For example, a rule of law that red heads always win or that
the party with the most money always prevails would provide fair notice
of the law and could be applied consistently and transparently. Yet, these
kinds of rules would be extremely troubling. These examples raise the
difficult question of whether the rule of law has a minimum substantive
content.
If this Essay were about a Justice who believed strongly that clear rules
were an important element of the rule of law, such as Justice Scalia, this
issue might have to be addressed. 9 However, Justice O'Connor does not
believe these kinds of rules are necessary, or for that matter even
desirable.' ° Moreover, my critique suggests that even when Justice
O'Connor embraces a relatively clear rule, such as strict scrutiny for

7. Radin, supra note 6, at 785.
8. Id.
9. Justice Scalia has said that sometimes "a bad rule is better than no rule at all." Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1175, 1179 (1989).
10. See discussion, infra Part III.
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affirmative action cases, she does not apply that rule with the consistency
required of the rule of law.1" Accordingly, this Essay need not address
whether consistently applied odious rules violate the rule of law.
Another important question is how important transparent legal
reasoning, as opposed to specific results, is to the rule of law. If the U.S.
Supreme Court announced it would no longer give any reasons for its
decisions and every result would simply be announced as a judgment for
a particular party, would there be a serious rule of law problem? This
might be a more difficult question than it first appears because there are
many instances where decision makers in our legal system do not justify
their decisions. 2 Juries do not give reasons for their verdicts, the U.S.
Supreme Court does not explain why it denies certiorari, and trial judges
routinely rule on evidentiary motions and sentence defendants without
offering explanations. 3
Regardless of whether the rule of law would be violated if the U.S.
Supreme Court did not offer any reasons for its decisions, the rule of law,
at a minimum, should prevent judges from offering patently false,
demonstrably incorrect, or hopelessly inconsistent reasons for theirjudicial
decisions. For example, if a judge consistently sentenced defendants to
maximum sentences in cases where the defendants pleaded guilty in open
court, and the judge announced he was doing so specifically because the
defendants never admitted their guilt, the rule of law might be implicated.
Similarly, a judge who engages in a pattern of intentionally ignoring
binding precedent or who deliberately mischaracterizes the facts or
holdings of previous cases might impair rule of law values. In these
instances, the government, through its judges, would be exercising its
power coercively for reasons that are knowingly false and misleading.
Having demonstrated that judges giving false reasons implicates the
rule of law, what about a judge who consistently offers no reasons?
Although this may be a difficult question for trial judges, the highest court
in the land should justify its results. Justification is the primary way the
Court can influence other participants in the legal system. There is a strong
connection between reasons and rules, 4 and decisions without reasons
generally cannot constrain future actors. The U.S. Supreme Court must
have some effect on lawyers, litigants, and judges for constitutional law to
be minimally stable, consistent, and transparent, especially in a culture
with a strong tradition of judicial review. How much constraint, stability
11. See discussion, infra Part III.C.2.
12. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633 (1995).
13. Id. at 634.
14. See id. at 641, 644-45.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

and consistency are required are difficult questions, but it is enough for my
thesis to suggest that a minimum amount is necessary to satisfy the rule of
law.
There is another reason why giving reasons is important, at least in the
Court from which there is no real appellate review. 5 The rule of law
requires the government to treat similarly situated people in a similar way.
The public cannot hold the Court accountable on this basis, however,
unless the Court offers reasons for its decisions. So from the perspective
of both stability and fairness, giving reasons is an important aspect of the
rule of law. The thesis of this essay is that Justice O'Connor's
constitutional law decisions, both internally within opinions, and
externally across opinions, fail to provide satisfactory reasons that give
rise to even minimal levels of stability, consistency, predictability, and
fairness. Section III supports this argument by detailing a number of
Justice O'Connor's constitutional law opinions and showing how they
jeopardized the rule of law.

1II. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DECISIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW

A. Allen v. Wright
The issue in Allen v. Wright'6 was whether parents of black school
children had standing to file a class action challenging the way the IRS
was enforcing its legal obligation to deny tax exempt status to private
schools that discriminated on the basis of race. 7 The parents claimed that
the government's subsidizing of these private schools made it more
difficult for their children to receive a desegregated public school
education." Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the alleged
segregation was sufficient to satisfy the injury prong of the standing test, 19
but that the plaintiffs could not show that the government caused their
injuries, and thus the plaintiffs' complaint had to be dismissed.2 °
Justice O'Connor said that it was purely speculative whether the
withdrawal of the tax exemptions would cause the allegedly discriminatory

15. Although there is always the remote possibility ofa constitutional amendment, this option
is almost never available to the losing party.
16. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
17. Id. at 739-40.
18. Id. at 746.
19. Id. at 766.
20. Id. at 756-57.
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private schools to change their policies and/or tuition in a way that would
drive white children back to the public schools.2 The dissent charged that
the plaintiffs were being improperly required to prove their case on the
merits to defeat a motion to dismiss.22
Prior to Allen, another Supreme Court case raised identical standing
issues. In Coit v. Green,23 parents of public school children claimed that
the IRS's policy of providing tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
private schools made it more difficult for their children to receive a
desegregated public school education.24 Justice O'Connor tried to
distinguish Coit partly on the basis that it involved a summary
affirmance.25 However, this was a throw-away line because standing is a
matter of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court cannot summarily
affirm any decision unless the plaintiffs have Article 111 standing. 6 Justice
O'Connor spent most of her opinion trying to distinguish Coiton the facts.
Keeping in mind that the issue in Allen was whether the plaintiffs had
standing to allege that tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private
schools furtheredpublic school segregation, here is what Justic O'Connor
wrote:
[T]he facts in the Coit case are sufficiently different from those
presented in this lawsuit that the absence of standing here is
unaffected by the possible propriety of standing there. In particular,
the suit in Coit was limited to the public schools of one State.
Moreover, the District Court found, based on extensive evidence
before it... that large numbers of segregatedprivateschools had
been establishedin the Statefor the purpose of avoiding a unitary
public school system [reference omitted]; that the tax exemptions
were critically important to the ability of such schools to succeed
[reference omitted]; and that the connection between the grant of
tax exemptions to discriminatoryschools and desegregationof the
public schools in the particularState was close enough to warrant
the conclusion that irreparable injury to the interest in

21. Id. at 758.
22. Id. at 774-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the dissent has the better argument, this
is not the part of the decision germane to my thesis.
23. 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
24. Allen, 468 U.S. at 763-64.
25. Id. at 764.
26. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 98-103 (1998) (Article
III standing questions implicate subject matter jurisdiction and must be resolved before a court can
take any action).
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desegregated education was threatened if the tax exemptions
27
continued.
There are significant rule of law problems with this analysis. First, Coit
is directly on point, yet the Court in Allen reached the opposite conclusion
without overturning a binding precedent. This is a problem of external
consistency. Second, the reasoning of the Court lacks any transparency.
Justice O'Connor suggested that the plaintiffs could not sufficiently prove,
for standing purposes, a proposition (the granting of tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory private schools threatened integrated public
schools) that plaintiffs in a previous case, after being given the opportunity
at trial, had proved exactly (tax exemptions to Mississippi private schools
furthered public school segregation).28 Worse, earlier in Allen, Justice
O'Connor said the following about how the Court should decide standing
issues: "In many cases the standing question can be answered chiefly by
comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in
prior standing cases."2 9 The "allegations" in Coit and Allen were virtually
the same, but the results on the standing question were completely
different. As the dissent in Allen pointed out, the majority's discussion of
Coit "stretches the imagination beyond its breaking point. ' ' 30 We are left
unable to discern the Court's real rationale, making it impossible to predict
how the next standing case will be decided or why two sets of similarly
situated plaintiffs were treated differently by the Supreme Court.
It bears emphasizing that the problem with Allen is not just that the
reasoning is unpersuasive, as that is true for many Supreme Court
constitutional law decisions. What is wrong with Allen is that two
indistinguishable cases were distinguished in a manner no different than
saying that the color of the plaintiff's hair was different in one case than
the other.31 The notion that Coit was distinguishable from Allen because
in Coit the plaintiffs proved what the Allen plaintiffs alleged, is in effect
no more persuasive than distinguishing Coit on the basis of the plaintiff's
hair color, a distinction that would certainly threaten the rule of law.

27. Allen, 468 U.S. at 764-65 (emphasis added).
28. See id.
29. Id. at 751-52.
30. Id. at 781 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Had that been the basis of the Allen decision, the rule of law would obviously be
implicated.
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B. New York v. United States & Printz v. United States
In New York v. United States, 32 the issue was whether Congress could
require the states to clean up low-level radioactive waste pursuant to a
statute sponsored by the National Governors Association.33 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, assumed, and the plaintiffs conceded, that
Congress's Commerce Clause power extended to this problem.34 The issue
was whether there was a state sovereignty limitation on that power.35
This particular question had a checkered history in the U.S. Supreme
Court. For many years, the Court did not find a Tenth Amendment
limitation on Congress's article I powers.36 The Court reversed these
earlier decisions in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,37 before returning
to its original position again just a few years later in Garciav. San Antonio
Metropolitan TransitAuthority.38 In Garcia,the Court explicitly held that
there is no judicially enforceable state sovereignty limitation where
Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.39 Justice O'Connor's
dissent agreed with Justice Rehnquist's dissenting prediction that the
Usery rule, in some form, would once "again command the support of a
majority of this Court."'' ° This statement suggests that the rule of law
governing this question would change once the people on the Court
changed - certainly an anti-rule of law prediction.
As predicted, when the personnel on the Court changed, so did the
result. In New York v. United States, the Court held that Congress may not
commandeer state legislatures, even when exercising Commerce Clause
powers.4' Justice O'Connor began her analysis by stating that "[i]f a power
is delegated to Congress in the [U.S.] Constitution, the Tenth Amendment
expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power
is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the [U.S.] Constitution has not conferred on

32. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
33. Id. at 149, 151.
34. Id. at 159-60.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding that the Commerce Clause
grants Congress the power to regulate wages paid to employees of state run enterprises); United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (finding no state sovereignty limitation on the federal
government's Commerce Clause power to regulate state-run interstate railroad commerce).
37. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
38. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
39. Id. at 556-57.
40. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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Congress. ' ' 42 She also wrote that "[t]he States unquestionably do retai[n]
a significant measure of sovereign authority... to the extent that the
Constitutionhas not divestedthem oftheiroriginalpowersandtransferred
those powers to the Federal Government. 4 3 These statements are
consistent with the Tenth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited-by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Since Justice O'Connor already conceded that Congress's Commerce
Clause authority properly extended to the clean-up of radioactive waste,
and that Congress could preempt state regulation in this area, one would
have thought that the federalism question would be easily decided in favor
of Congress. a" However, Justice O'Connor came up with a different
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment:
Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations
contained in the Constitution. Thus, for example, under the
Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in
interstate commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of
that power by the First Amendment. The Tenth Amendment
likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not
derivedfrom the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we
have discussed, is essentially a tautology.
Instead,the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the
Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given
instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus
directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state
46
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article Ipower.
42. Id. at 156 (emphasis omitted).
43. Id. (quoting Garcia,469 U.S. at 549) (emphasis added).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. X.

45. The Court said that:
Petitioners do not contend that Congress lacks the power to regulate the disposal
of low level radioactive waste. Space in radioactive waste disposal sites is
frequently sold by residents of one State to residents of another. Regulation of the
resulting interstate market in waste disposal is therefore well within Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause. Petitioners likewise do not dispute that
under the Supremacy Clause Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt state
radioactive waste regulation. Petitioners contend only that the Tenth Amendment
limits the power of Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen.
New York, 505 U.S. at 159-60 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 156-57 (emphasis added).
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The last three sentences of this paragraph simply cannot be reconciled
with Justice O'Connor's previous statements regarding the Tenth
Amendment. If it is true that "[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation
of that power to the States,"4' 7 then it also must be true that if Congress is
exercising an enumerated power (a power surrendered by the states), the
Tenth Amendment does not affect the exercise of that power. Yet, Justice
O'Connor later concludes that the "Tenth Amendment thus directs us to
determine... whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a
limitation on an Article I power. 4 8 Her reasoning does not make sense,
and one is left with a bare conclusion inconsistent with other parts of the
same judicial opinion.
In New York, Justice O'Connor summarily announced that "[wle have
always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts."4' 9 The
Court returned to this issue in Printz v. United States,5" where the Court
held that the federal government could not require state law enforcement
officials to conduct background checks on gun purchasers." Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia reaffirmed that the federal government may not
conscript state officials into federal service, even for a limited period of
time and for non-policymaking duties. 2
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the
decision (which was consistent with New York), but also stating that the
decision did not necessarily foreclose "ministerial reporting requirements,"
such as requiring state law enforcement agencies to report information
about missing children to the FBI. 3 In light of her strongly announced rule
in New York, and the tone of the majority opinion in Printz which
suggested the anti-commandeering principle was absolute, it is unclear
what Justice O'Connor's caveat could mean. After all, the gun law at issue
in Printzalso concerned reporting requirements.54 The fact that she deems
it more important for the government to receive information about missing
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
CT. REV.

Id. at 156 (emphasis omitted).
Id.at 157.
Id. at 166.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 932.
Id. at 935.
Id.at 936 (O'Connor J., concurring).
See Evan H. Caminker, Printz,State Sovereignty, andthe Limits ofFormalism, 1997 SuP.
199, 235 (1997).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

children than information about guns does not begin to explain why
Congress may coerce state sheriffs to perform one task but not the other.
Certainly, there is nothing in the text, history or structure of the Tenth
Amendment or the Commerce Clause to even remotely suggest such a
distinction. Thus, in both New York and Printz, Justice O'Connor
articulated a clear rule (no commandeering) but also suggested that rule
would not apply to another indistinguishable situation. This type of
decision making is the rule of personal preference, not the rule of law.
C. Abortion, Affirmative Action, and Establishment
Three of the most contentious issues in constitutional law are abortion,
affirmative action, and the separation of church and state. If a U.S.
Supreme Court Justice resolved these controversies with a simple thumbs
up or thumbs down vote, without explaining why two similarly situated
cases in each area were not treated alike, the rule of law would be in
danger." Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence in each of these three areas is
the functional equivalent of a thumbs up/thumbs down vote. Her opinions
are impossible to reconcile with one another, and she articulates vague
legal standards that are impossible for future courts to apply in a principled
manner.
1. Abortion
In PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey,56 the
joint opinion of the Court signed by Justices O'Connor, Souter, and
Kennedy adopted an "undue burden" standard for judges reviewing the
constitutionality of laws infringing on a woman's choice to have an
abortion." Justice O'Connor had articulated this standard long before
Casey was decided and before Justices Souter and Kennedy were even on
the bench.58 Leaving aside the rule of law implications of the joint
opinion's reliance on Roe as a matter of stare decisis, even as it discarded
the trimester framework which formed the essential holding in Roe,59 the
"undue burden" standard is an excellent example of a legal rule which is
the functional equivalent of a "thumbs up or thumbs down" vote in each

55. In this circumstance, for example, there would be no way of determining whether similar
cases were being treated similarly by the Court.
56. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
57. Id. at 874, 877.
58. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 993-994 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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individual case. It is no different than a legal standard that abortion
restrictions are constitutional as long as they do not deter abortions too
much without any explanation of when that threshold may be crossed.60
One issue presented in Casey involved the validity of a law requiring
a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period between the time a woman
received state-required information regarding an abortion and the time the
procedure could be scheduled. 6' The law was challenged on grounds that
it placed an "undue burden" on women seeking abortions, in violation of
the principles set forth in Casey.62 In a joint opinion, the Court held that
the requirement did not create an undue burden, although it did not
disagree with the district court's finding that the rule placed "particular
burdens" on women seeking abortions. 63 Thus, courts now had to
distinguish "undue burdens" from "particular burdens."
Casey also involved a law that required women to notify their spouse6 4
before having an abortion, unless doing so would place them in danger.
The joint opinion struck down this provision mostly over concern for
women who would be put in danger by notifying their husbands, even
though the law created an exception for exactly this circumstance. The
joint opinion never adequately explained why the twenty-four hour
provision did not amount to an undue burden while the spousal notification
requirement did. Justice Scalia discussed the rule of law problems with this
type of legal reasoning:
The shortcomings of Roe did not include lack of clarity: Virtually
all regulation of abortion before the third trimester was invalid....
[T]he [undue burden] standard is inherently manipulable....
The inherently standardless nature of this inquiry invites the
district judge to give effect to his personal preferences about
abortion. By finding and relying upon the right facts, he can
invalidate ... almost any abortion restriction that strikes him as
"undue" - subject, of course, to the possibility of being reversed

60. Id. at 985-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 844.
62. See id. at 885-86.
63. Id. at 886-87.
64. The contested law said that a woman did not have to notify her spouse if she "believes
that notifying her husband will cause him or someone else to inflict bodily injury upon her." Id. at
887.
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by a court of appeals or Supreme Court that is65as unconstrained in
reviewing his decision as he was in making it.
If the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it would approve those
abortion regulations that did not get in the way of women "too much," and
invalidate those that did, and lower courts could do the same, subject to
appellate review and stare decisis, the law on abortion would be the rule
of what each judge preferred in each individual case, not the rule of law.
The "undue burden" standard first articulated by Justice O'Connor, in
effect, gives us the same legal regime.
2. Affirmative Action
Justice O'Connor's affirmative action decisions present similar
problems. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' and Adarand
Constructors, Inc., v. Pena,6 7 Justice O'Connor held that all racial
preferences, even those used for the "benign" purpose of helping
traditionally disadvantaged groups, are subject to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.68 Thus, in the former case, the city of Richmond
was not allowed to establish a set aside for city building contracts for
minority-owned businesses, despite Congress's findings of widespread
discrimination in the industry. As analyzed by Justice O'Connor, unless
such preferences "are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in
fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility."69 Similarly, in Adarand, Justice O'Connor wrote that "any
person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental
actor... justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal
treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny. "70
In these cases, Justice O'Connor appears hostile to any affirmative
action measures not designed to remedy specific instances of
discrimination. The dissenting opinions consistently argued for a more
deferential standard of review.7' However, when the issue of racial
preferences in university admissions came before the Court, Justice

65. Id. at 985-86, 992 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
67. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
68. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; Adarand,515 U.S. at 226.
69. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
70. Adarand,515 U.S. at 224.
71. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 534 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 271
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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O'Connor veered away from her previous decisions and the rules she
articulated therein.72
In Grutter v. Bollinger,73 the issue was whether the University of
Michigan Law School could employ racial preferences to ensure that a
"critical mass" of minority students attended the school.74 Similarly, the
issue in Gratz v. Bollinger75 was whether the college at the University of
Michigan could use race as an automatic "plus factor" for minority
applicants.76 In both cases, educational diversity was the asserted state
interest. Four Justices, who like Justice O'Connor, had previously stated
that all racial classifications deserve strict scrutiny, voted to strike down
the use of race in both cases.77 Justice O'Connor, however, voted to allow
the use of race in one case but not the other. Her reasons for doing so,
however, were quite suspect.
The law school program passed muster under Justice O'Connor's
interpretation of strict scrutiny because the use of race was done on an
individualized basis,7" whereas the undergraduate program was
unconstitutional because it used race as an automatic "plus factor" for all
protected minorities.79 Justice O'Connor never explained why these
different uses of racial classifications should receive different analysis
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice O'Connor also failed to reveal
why giving law school administrators more discretion to use race was
more narrowly tailored than the circumscribed discretion exercised by the
undergraduate admissions officers. Additionally, she did not explain why
she applied a far more deferential version of strict scrutiny in Grutterthan
she used in Gratz or in any other affirmative action case.
Even more troubling, Justice O'Connor noted in Grutter that the law
school sought to "enroll a 'critical mass' of minority students ....The
Law School's interest is not simply to assure within its student body some

72. See Girardeau A. Spann, NeutralizingGrutter,7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 633,641 n.44 (2005)
("Indeed, the reason that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the affirmative action program at
issue in Grutterwas that Justice O'Connor, for the first time, switched sides and voted in favor of
upholding a racial affirmative action program on the merits.").
73. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
74. Seeid. at311,318.
75. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
76. See id.at 255-56.
77. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-86 (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
dissenting from decision upholding law school's use of race in admissions); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 248
(same Justices invalidating college's use of race in admissions).
78. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
79. The college argued that it had to review too many applications to conduct the kind of
individualized review performed by the law school.
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specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or
ethnic origin.... That would amount to outright racial balancing, which
is patently unconstitutional.... "8 The law school conceded that they tried
to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students every year." In fact, the
percentage of such students enrolled was often extremely close to the
percentage who applied.82 According to Justice O'Connor, if the law
school had said that it wanted twelve percent minorities or eighteen
percent minorities, it would have set an unconstitutional quota. However,
admitting a "critical mass" of minorities every year did not amount to such
a quota,83 a distinction very difficult to understand much less justify.
Additionally, at the end of Justice O'Connor's opinion she wrote "[w]e
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest approved today."8 4 Regardless of
whether this language is viewed as dicta or a binding part of the holding
of the case, it is a completely inappropriate statement for the Court to
deliver. How does Justice O'Connor know what the state of racial affairs
will be in twenty-five years? Given the historical and political complexity
of the affirmative action debate, it is judicial hubris for Justice O'Connor
to suggest that she has some special awareness as to when race-based
measures may no longer be necessary. Whether or not such hubris
implicates the rule of law, it is an inappropriate and arbitrary exercise of
judicial power.85
3. Establishment of Religion
Perhaps the area of law where Justice O'Connor has had the most
significant impact, and the one that most clearly reflects the rule of law
implications of herjurisprudence, is the First Amendment's Establishment

80. Grutter,539 U.S. at 333 (internal quotations omitted).
81. Id.at 335-36.
82. See id. at 384-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. How can it be that the purposeful goal of enrolling a critical mass of minorities every
year, no matter what, and then admitting a number very close to the number who applied, is not the
same as a quota or racial balancing, which Justice O'Connor says is "patently unconstitutional?"
This is beyond all reason and strongly suggests that the Court is not providing the real basis for its
decision.
84. Grutter,539 U.S. at 343.
85. See Stephen B. Presser, A Conservative Comment on ProfessorCrump, 56 FLA. L. REV.
789, 795-96 (2004) ("Professor Crump is quite correct to call Justice O'Connor's pronouncement
that the ruling in Grutter should expire after twenty-five years 'eye-popping' - although I prefer
'mind-boggling' - but such a sunset provision would not be surprising in a legislative act. It is,
however, hardly the stuff of natural law, original understanding, or adherence to previous
precedent.") (footnotes omitted).
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Clause.86 In 1984, in a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,87 she
advocated a new approach to the Establishment Clause by modifying the
three-part Lemon test that had been used (and in the opinion of many
judges and scholars abused) by the Court since 1971 88 Justice O'Connor
suggested that the Court replace the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test
with a new "endorsement test," which asks whether the government
practice in question sends a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion.89 According to Justice O'Connor, the endorsement of religion
"sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."9 °
Under this test, the government may not endorse or favor religion, and
Justice O'Connor has used those words interchangeably.9"
An example of Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis is found in
Lynch v. Donnelly. The issue in Lynch was whether the city of Pawtucket,
Rhode Island violated the Establishment Clause by paying for and erecting
a Christmas display in a private park.92 The display included a number of
secular symbols of the season, but also featured a creche depicting the
infant Jesus, Mary, and Joseph.93 It would be easy, as some scholars and

judges have suggested, to conclude that because Pawtucket only displayed
symbols of Christmas, the city was endorsing Christianity.94 Furthermore,
86. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
87. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
88. See id. at 687-94. The Lemon test asked whether the government practice being
challenged had a secular purpose, whether its primary effect was to advance religion and whether
the practice caused excessive government entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
89. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
90. See id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. See id.
at 694 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
92. See id.
at 670-71.
93. Id.
94. Jamin Raskin wrote:
[T]he most plausible purpose for taking the reindeer, robots, dancing bears,
snowflakes, and candy canes - signifiers that already amply express holiday
spirit - and adding to them the Christmas nativity characters of Jesus, Mary,
[and] Joseph . ..would be precisely to endorse and promote the particular
religious faith and practice represented by these figures: Christianity. Even if one
claims that the purpose is simply to acknowledge the religious preferences of the
majority, such a selective recognition has no rational secular purpose other than
to endorse the practices of a religious group. After all, why does the majority need
to have its preferences honored in this way?
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if the display was adjudged unconstitutional under the endorsement test,
it could logically follow that numerous other governmental practices, such
as "In God we Trust" on our coins, would also be held invalid. 95 Such
practices seem to endorse religion over non-religion, or at least the belief
in God over non-belief.96 If endorsement were the real test, these practices
would certainly be unconstitutional.
Endorsement though, is not the real test, which is why Justice
O'Connor voted to uphold the creche in Lynch despite its obvious
symbolic approval of the Christian religion (and why she would approve
other official endorsements of the belief in God).97 The real test is whether
a governmental practice endorses religion too much, just as the test in
abortion cases is whether the burden is too undue. This kind of test,
however, is no test at all.
In Lynch, Justice O'Connor argued that the city's purpose was to
celebrate a public holiday, not to endorse Christianity, and that the
celebration of such a holiday "is not understood to endorse the religious
content of the holiday...'. ."" As both the district court and the dissenting
Justices point out, it would have been easy for Pawtucket to celebrate the
public holiday without including any religious symbols.99 It is one thing
for the government to acknowledge the reality that many Americans view
Christmas as a special day,"4 ° but quite another for the government to
sponsor specific religious symbols important only to the adherents of a
particular religion.
The point here is not that the display violated the Establishment Clause
(one could reasonably argue that the Clause is not violated absent
governmental coercion), but that the display clearly violated the
endorsement principle articulated, but then misapplied, by Justice
O'Connor. Once again, there is a lack of transparency in her reasoning,
and the articulation of a principle that when applied, is infinitely

Jamin B. Raskin, PollingEstablishment:JudicialReview,Democracy,and the EndorsementTheory
of The Establishment Clause-Commentaryon MeasuredEndorsement, 60 MD. L. REv. 761,770
dissenting).
(2001). See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 699-700 (Brennan, J.,
95. Other examples that would be unconstitutional include the words "Under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance and the practice of starting legislative sessions with prayers.
96. Justice O'Connor has said that the "Religion Clauses . . .protect adherents of all
religions, as well as those who believe in no religion at all." McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.
Ct. 2722, 2747 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-94 (O'Connor J., concurring).
98. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Id.at 699-700 (Brennan J., dissenting).
100. For example, the government could declare it a national holiday so that families can
spend time together.
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manipulable. This erodes rule of law values and destabilizes legal doctrine,
as demonstrated by the cases following Lynch.
The next case involving the interplay of religious displays and
government property was Allegheny County v. ACLU.' In this case, the
County placed a creche on the staircase of a courthouse, and put a
Chanukah menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign saluting liberty outside
a city-county building.' °2 A majority of the Court, including Justice
O'Connor, applying the endorsement test, held that the creche, because it
stood alone, violated the Establishment Clause.'° 3 Conversely, the display
with the menorah was held constitutional because the menorah, standing
among other holiday symbols, did not constitute an endorsement of
religion. 1°" In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated her belief
that "every government practice must be judged in its unique
whether it constitutes an endorsement or
circumstances to determine
05
disapproval of religion.'
There can be no dispute that Justice O'Connor is sincere when she
states that each Establishment Clause case must be judged by its "unique
circumstances." There were many factors relevant to Justice O'Connor's
decisions relating to the religious displays at issue in Lynch and Allegheny
County. One important factor was whether the religious symbol was on
public or private property. Whereas in Lynch the creche was owned by the
city but placed in a private park, the creche in Allegheny County was on
public property.'0 6 Another factor asks, if the religious symbol is on public
property, is it a "core" governmental building.'0 7 The menorah was on
government property, but apparently not "core" governmental property. A
third consideration is whether the religious symbol is surrounded by
secular symbols.'0 8 The creche upheld in Lynch was surrounded by secular
symbols, but the creche invalidated in Allegheny County was not."°9 The
menorah upheld in Allegheny County was also surrounded by secular
symbols.l o Another factor is the purpose behind the display of the

101. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
102. Id.at 579.
103. Id. at 598.
104. Id. at 620-21.
105. See id.at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688,
concurring)).
694 (O'Connor, J.,
106. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 625-26.
109. See ACLU, 492 U.S. at 626.
110. The symbols included a sign saluting liberty and a Christmas tree, which Justice
O'Connor found not to be a religious symbol. See id. at 633.
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religious symbol. According to Justice O'Connor, the purpose behind the
creche in Lynch was to celebrate the holiday season, but the purpose
behind the creche in Allegheny County was to celebrate Christianity."1 The
purpose behind the display with the Chanukah menorah, the Christmas
tree, and the sign saluting liberty was to celebrate pluralism." 2 A final
factor is the history of the practice at issue. This factor, according to
Justice O'Connor, helped distinguish legislative prayers and "In God We
Trust" on our coins, which she would uphold, from the creche inAllegheny
County, which she found unconstitutional." 3 The difference is between
and
government "acknowledgment of religion," which is permissible
4
government "endorsement" of religion, which is impermissible. 1
What is perhaps most interesting, and disappointing, about this list of
factors is that they are inconsistent with how Justice O'Connor actually
describes her own Establishment Clause views, which again leads to a lack
of transparency and inconsistency that threatens the rule of law. In
Allegheny County, in response to Justice Kennedy's argument that actual
governmental coercion should be required before a plaintiff could show an
Establishment Clause violation, she wrote that "the endorsement standard
recognizes that the religious liberty so precious to the citizens who make
up our diverse country is protected, not impeded, when government avoids
' She also
endorsing religion or favoring particular beliefs over others."115
argued that the government must not convey "a message that religion or
a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.""..6
How can it be said that the government is not endorsing certain
religions over others when it pays for one and only one religious symbol
like the creche in Lynch? How can it be said that the government is not
favoring religion over non-religion when it puts "In God We Trust" on our
national currency, a practice approved by Justice O'Connor?.. 7 As
mentioned earlier, Justice O'Connor's endorsement test does not really ask
whether the government is endorsing religion (which it does routinely), but
rather whether the government is endorsing religion too much." 8 The list
of factors above".9 is relevant, but also leads to ad hoc decision making.
111. Id. at 626-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. See id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. See id at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. See ACLU, 492 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
117. See supratext accompanying note 97.
118. See supratext accompanying notes 97-98.
119. See supratext accompanying notes 106-114.
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This prevents lower court judges, the states, and the people from
understanding and applying the law in this area. It is no surprise that after
these opinions there were legions of cases attacking the legality of
religious symbols on governmental property leading to many different
results. 120
When the controversy once again returned to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Justice O'Connor once again demonstrated her lack of commitment to rule
of law principles. During the 2004-05 term, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided two cases involving the placement of the Ten Commandments on
governmental property. In one case, McCreary County v. ACLU, 121 the Ten
Commandments were posted in a county courthouse. 122 In the other case,
Van Orden v. Perry,123 the Commandments were posted on a six foot high
monolith on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. The Court upheld
the
125
monolith 124 but invalidated the Commandments in the courthouse.

In McCrearyCounty, there was significant evidence suggesting that the
Commandments were placed in the courthouse by a government official
specifically to promote religion. 26 In contrast, the Commandments
displayed on the monolith outside the state capitol in Van Orden had been
there for many years along with twenty-one other historical markers and
seventeen other monuments. 127 Justice O'Connor voted to invalidate both
displays, though she gave her reasoning only in McCreary County.28 She
wrote:
Voluntary religious belief and expression may be as threatened
when government takes the mantle of religion upon itself as when
government directly interferes with private religious practices.
120. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Greenhalgh, The Establishment Clause and Government Religious
Displays: The Court That Stole Christmas, 15 TOUROL. REv. 1053, 1083-84 (1999) ("As a result,
we are left with a colossal number of confused lower courts left to decide if a candy cane or a
poinsettia has enough secular meaning to dilute the religious component of a creche.").
121. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
122. Id. at 2727.
123. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
124. ld.at 2858.
125. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2745.
126. Id. at 2735-41.
127. Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2858.
128. See id. at 2891 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2746-47
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Her opinion reads much more like a press release or a political speech
than a judicial opinion: "At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of the
assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our
regard for constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private
religious exercise to flourish." Id. at 2746 (O'Connor J., concurring).
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When the government associatesone set ofreligiousbeliefs with the
state and identifies nonadherentsas outsiders, it encroaches upon
the individual'sdecision about whether and how to worship.....
Allowing government to be a potential mouthpiecefor competing
religious ideas risks the sort of division
that might easily spill over
29
into suppressionof rival beliefs. 1
In her concurrence, O'Connor described the reasons why government
and religion must remain separate as if these general propositions could
decide all the hard questions, 30 and as if she had not previously voted to
uphold the government's display of a creche, the government's display of
a menorah and Christmas tree on public property, and numerous practices
incorporating God into our national identity.'3 ' There is simply no way to
reconcile her decision in these cases with her reasoning put forth in
McCreary County. Perhaps a politician can faithfully perform her job by
such painstaking focus on specific details, but a Supreme
Court Justice
13 2
should and, to maintain the rule of law, must do better.
If Justice O'Connor had faithfully applied the factors she articulated in
Allegheny County and Lynch, she should have voted to uphold the
monolith that displayed the Ten Commandments on the capitol grounds.
The monolith had been in place for forty years before it was challenged,
it was surrounded by a number of secular monuments and historical
markers, it was donated to the State by a secular organization, and there
was no evidence that the state acted for religious reasons in accepting the
gift. In fact, Justice Breyer painstakingly went through the factors
previously identified by Justice O'Connor and concluded the display was
constitutional. 34 Justice O'Connor's dissent, however, made no effort to
explain her vote and how it could possibly be consistent with her votes in

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 2746-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See id.at 2746-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See supra notes 92-117 and accompanying text.
See Presser, supra note 85, at 795. Presser wrote:

Justice O'Connor had considerable experience as a state legislator before serving
on the Supreme Court, and it certainly appears as if her "balancing tests" are more
the tools of someone engaging in the kind of policy choices characteristic of a
state legislator than anyone seeking neutrally to apply a pre-existing rule of law.
Id.
133. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2870 (2005) (Breyer J., concurring).
134. See id. at 2868-73 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Lynch and Allegheny or her proffered factors.'35 The decision left the
public with absolutely no idea how she would vote in the next religious
symbols case, nor could any meaningful principles be gleaned from her
four written opinions on the matter, other than that each case has to be
decided narrowly and pursuant to its unique circumstances.' 36 This type of
judicial approach might be acceptable if her results were even somewhat
consistent, or if her reasoning were more transparent. Unfortunately, her
results are at odds with themselves, and her reasoning is obscure and
internally contradictory. As both Justices Thomas and Scalia pointed out,
this kind ofjurisprudence threatens the rule of law.' 37
D. A Few Other Examples
It is not only in well publicized constitutional cases such as those
involving abortion and affirmative action that Justice O'Connor fails to
provide consistency and coherence. For example, she has also failed to
articulate with any clarity her views on the admittedly difficult questions
surrounding the judicial creation of private rights of action for damages
directly under the U.S. Constitution. As a result, similarly situated and
sympathetic plaintiffs have received quite different treatment from Justice
O'Connor.
In Bivens v. United States," the Court allowed the plaintiff to sue FBI
agents directly under the Fourth Amendment for damages resulting from
an illegal search.' 39 The conservatives on the Rehnquist Court have
consistently refused to extend Bivens to other constitutional provisions.
For example, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, Justice O'Connor voted to refuse
to allow social security disability plaintiffs to bring a Bivens action against
federal officials accused of acting in bad faith for terminating benefits for
arbitrary and capricious reasons. "4Though the plaintiffs had their benefits
restored, they sought consequential damages.' 4 ' Justice O'Connor found,
however, that Congress's design of the massive welfare system, in which
it refused to create a constitutional remedy, was a "special factor" that

135. See id. at 2891 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. See supra text accompanying note 105-114.
137. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2751 (Scalia, J., dissenting); See Van Orden, 125 S.
Ct. at 2866-68 (Thomas J., concurring).
138. Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
139. Id. at389.
140. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414 (1988).
141. See id. at 417-19, 428-29.
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counseled hesitation, and that the Court should not create a constitutional
remedy.'42 She reached this result despite saying the following:
We agree that suffering months of delay in receiving the income on
which one has depended for the very necessities of life cannot be
fully remedied by the "belated restoration of back benefits." The
trauma to respondents, and thousands of others like them, must
surely have gone beyond what anyone of normal sensibilities would
wish to see imposed on innocent disabled citizens. Nor would we
care to "trivialize" the nature of the wrongs alleged in this case.
Congress, however, has addressed the problems created by state
agencies' wrongful termination of disability benefits. Whether or
not we believe that its response was the best response, Congress is
the body charged with making the inevitable compromises required
in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits program.'43
Without suggesting that the Court reached the wrong result in this case,
compare it to a case raising a similar issue decided just one year before. In
United States v. Stanley,1" a former army officer sued the military for
injuries suffered when he was secretly given LSD in the 1950s.' 45 He
developed a host of mental problems, and only discovered the secret
testing many years later.'" In a previous case, Chappell v. Wallace,'4 7 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that it would not extend Bivens to suits against
military officers because of the special needs of the military and
Congress's creation of comprehensive rules and regulations for the armed
forces.' 48 Justice O'Connor cited Chappellwith approval in Schweiker.'49
In Stanley, however, she dissented from the Court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's Bivens action saying the following:
In my view, conduct of the type alleged in this case is so far beyond
the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply
cannot be considered a part of the military mission. The bar created
by Chappell... surely cannot insulate defendants from liability for

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 423, 428, 29.
Id. at 428-29.
483 U.S. 669 (1987).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 671-72.
462 U.S. 296 (1983).
Id. at 304.
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 422 (1988).
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deliberate and calculated exposure of otherwise healthy military
personnel to medical experimentation without their consent ... and
for no other reason than to gather information on the effect of
lysergic acid diethylamide on human beings. No judicially crafted
rule should insulate from liability the involuntary and unknowing
human experimentation alleged to have occurred in this case. 5 '
In Schweiker, Justice O'Connor admitted that the defendants acted in
bad faith and that "[t]he trauma to respondents, and thousands of others
like them, must surely have gone beyond what anyone of normal
sensibilities would wish to see imposed on innocent disabled citizens,"''
and in Stanley she said the government's conduct went "far beyond the
bounds of human decency."' 52 Yet, she found a cause of action in Stanley,
but not in Schweiker, without explaining why Stanley deserved relief but
the Schweiker plaintiffs did not. Perhaps she believed that being given
LSD secretly is in some sense worse than being denied welfare benefits
arbitrarily. Still, this is not deciding cases under law; it is deciding cases
using personal values and subjective moral beliefs. The plaintiffs in
Schweiker deserved a better explanation as to why their claims were
dismissed.
Finally, one of the most striking examples of Justice O'Connor's
failure to provide fairness, consistency, and transparency is Rogers v.
Tennessee,'53 a case directly implicating rule of law principles. The
defendant in this case stabbed his victim with a butcher knife; the victim
died fifteen months later. 54 The defendant was convicted of second degree
murder despite the common law rule, then applicable in Tennessee, that a
defendant could not be convicted of murder if the death occurred more
than a year and a day after the attack.'55 The Tennessee Supreme Court
held that this rule should be abolished, and that its abolition should be
applied retroactively to this case.'56
The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits legislatures from punishing people
for crimes that were not crimes at the time of the defendant's conduct.'57
The text of the clause, however, refers only to state legislatures, not state
150. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 709-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 428-29.
152. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
154. Id. at 954.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 455.
157. The ex post factor clause states that "No State shall... pass any ... ex post factor Law."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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courts. ' Nevertheless, in Bouie v. City of Columbia,159 the U.S. Supreme
Court said that ex post facto principles did apply to courts through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because "[i]f a state
legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing a law, it
must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process
Clause from achieving exactly the same result by judicial construction."' 6 °
Despite the clear holding of Bouie, in Rogers Justice O'Connor held
that the Due Process Clause did not specifically incorporate ex post facto
limitations. She said that Bouie was based on core due process concepts
such as fair notice and forseeability, and that the Bouie Court's discussion
of the Ex Post Facto Clause was dicta.' 6 ' Extending the Ex Post Facto
Clause to the courts, according to Justice O'Connor, would show too little
' She explained
regard for the differences between legislatures and courts. 62
that courts have to balance flexibility and precedent, and applying ex post
facto limitations to the courts would "unduly impair the incremental and
reasoned development of precedent that is the foundation of the common
law system."' 63
In light of this holding, the question in Rogers was not whether the
Tennessee Supreme Court violated ex post facto limitations by
retroactively abolishing the "year and a day rule," but whether the
defendant had fair warning that the rule might be changed. Justice
O'Connor found that he did since the law had become an "outdated relic
of the common law," because the rule had been abolished in most other
jurisdictions, and at the time of the crime, the rule had only "a tenuous
foothold" in the criminal law of Tennessee. " Therefore, even though the
"year and a day rule" was still technically part of the Tennessee criminal
law at the time of Rogers' offense, he could be convicted of murder
despite the fact that his victim died fifteen months after the crime.'65
Justice O'Connor's characterization of the Bouie Court's discussion of
the Ex Post Facto Clause as dicta is simply wrong. The discussion was
"essential to the holding of that case," and it was repeated at the end of the
opinion before the holding was announced. 166 As Justice Scalia noted in
158. See id.

159. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
160.
161.
316, 318
162.

Id. at 353-54.
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,458-59(2001); see Leading Case, 115
(2001).
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460; Leading Case, supra note 161, at 318-19.

163. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461.
164. Id.at 462-64; Leading Case, supranote 161, at 319.
165. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 466-67.
166. Leading Case, supra note 161, at 321-22.
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dissent, Justice O'Connor's determination that the Ex Post Facto
if the "concept of dictum
discussion in Bouie was dicta could be right only167
opinion.'
the
of
reasoning
very
the
... includes
Justice O'Connor's mangling of Bouie in Rogers violates rule of law
principles on several levels. The substantive issue in these cases was
whether a person can be convicted of a crime that was not an offense at the
time of his action. The answer under the Ex Post Facto Clause is no, and
legislatures therefore cannot make criminal laws retroactive. In Boule, the
Court held that it would be unfair for state courts to accomplish what state
legislatures could not. In Rogers, not only did the Court not faithfully
apply rules of precedent set forth in Bouie, it then went on to hold that
courts may retroactively apply criminal laws as long as the defendant had
fair notice, a requirement the Court diluted beyond recognition. Ironically,
the reason Justice O'Connor gave for justifying this new rule was that
courts are more constrained than legislatures and therefore retroactive
judicial interpretations pose fewer dangers than retroactive legislative
changes.1 68 However, she proposed this in a case where the Court flatly
misinterpreted precedent thereby depriving the defendant of fair notice.
Even in cases involving rule of law questions, Justice O'Connor does not
correctly apply rule of law principles.
There is a plausible explanation as to why Justice O'Connor departed
from the Bouie rule in Rogers. The defendants in Boule were civil rights
protesters who were asked to leave a "whites only" counter during the
early 1960s.' 69 Their convictions for criminal trespass were upheld in the
state courts even though South Carolina's trespass laws had never been
interpreted to apply in similar circumstances. 7 ' In Rogers, the defendant
had far less sympathy; his crime simply involved "an isolated stabbing
with no socially redeeming purpose."'' Still, the factual differences in
these cases should not make a constitutional difference because no one
should be convicted of a crime that was not a crime at the time the conduct
occurred. The fact that the Bouie defendants did not receive that protection
demonstrates the injustice of the Rogers decision, and also shows that
Justice O'Connor's belief that courts are less likely than legislatures to
violate rule of law principles is sometimes incorrect.
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171.

Rogers, 532 U.S. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 460-62.
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 348 (1964).
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Leading Case, supra note 161, at 323.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING AND THE RULE OF LAW

For most of her time on the bench, Justice O'Connor served as the
crucial swing vote.'72 Perhaps it is appropriate for the Justice consistently
in the philosophical middle to write narrow opinions, leaving the difficult
questions for another day and another court. But if a Justice is going to
consistently play that role, the rule of law requires that she at least explain
the reasons for her decisions and detail why she assigns importance to the
values she identifies and applies. This Essay has demonstrated that the
main flaw in Justice O'Connor's opinions was not the narrowness of her
focus or the use of open-ended balancing tests, but the rampant internal
and external inconsistency and lack of transparency in her reasoning. In
yet another context, legislative redistricting, a noted Court observer said
the following about Justice O'Connor's role as the swing vote:
[Justice] O'Connor's minimalism entangles individual Justices in
the political process to the most minute and confusing degree.
Because O'Connor has not explicated the rules or standards that, in
her view, distinguish constitutional from unconstitutional districts,
the process of redistricting in the wake of the 1990 census has
largely become an exercise in reading Justice O'Connor's mind.
Justice Stewart's famous test for obscenity - "I know it when I see
it" - was based on the conviction that there was a social consensus
about what is obscene, but that it reflected too many legal and
moral permutations to be captured in a single judicial rule. Justice
O'Connor's focus on "oddly shaped districts," by contrast, seems
to rest on no broader aesthetic than the sensibility of O'Connor
herself.'73
The rule of law requires more than the application of a Justice's
"sensibility" to difficult legal questions, especially if that judge's opinion
is to be the supreme law of the land. Whether the test was "undue
burden, ' 174 "endorsement of religion," '7 5 or a not so strict scrutiny in one
affirmative action case and an extremely "strict" scrutiny in every other
affirmative action decision,' 76 Justice O'Connor's inordinate attention to

172. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451
(2001); Adarand Constr., Inc. V. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984).
173. Jeffrey Rosen, Forward,97 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1331 (1999).
174. See supraPart III.C. 1.
175. See supra Part III.C.3.
176. See supra Part III.C.2.
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specific facts led to a maze of incoherent, unexplainable, and unpredictable
legal doctrine.
When U.S. Supreme Court Justices decide cases with reasoning that
either cannot be applied in the future, or with reasoning that is overtly
arbitrary, they come much closer to dissolving the already murky line
between the legal and the political process. For example, by allowing the
states to require a twenty-four hour waiting period for women seeking
abortion but not allowing them to require notification of the father based
on the "undue burden" test, Justice O'Connor sounds more like a legislator
determining what is best, rather than a Justice deciding what is
constitutional. By deciding that race can be used by an elite law school to
admit a "critical mass" of minorities, but denying the same tool to the City
of Richmond for its city contracts and to an undergraduate institution for
its students, Justice O'Connor is deciding when affirmative action can be
employed not through some legal rule or balancing test, but based on
factors familiar to her and other hard to identify values. By deciding that
some religious symbols on governmental property illegally endorse
religion but others constitutionally acknowledge religion, without
consistently applying the many factors she identified as relevant, Justice
O'Connor sounds more like a policymaker than a decision maker.
Expensive, time consuming, and agonizing lower court litigation is
normally the result of such ad hoc decisionmaking. 1'
Unlike Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia has continually argued for
bright line rules for constitutional cases. 7 ' I have previously suggested that
Scalia undervalues the need for a more incremental approach to
constitutional decision making.'79 The problem with Scalia's project is not
that clear rules are ill suited for constitutional doctrine, but the rigidity of
his views on the appropriate balance between those rules and flexible
standards. The same can be said of Justice O'Connor, but in reverse. Her
obsession with providing as little guidance as possible for the future
threatened the coherence and consistency of numerous constitutional law
doctrines. 8 ' This anti-rule philosophy posed a greater threat to the rule of
law than Justice Scalia's pro-rule directives because her decisions were
often impossible to understand and reconcile with her other opinions, and
because she did not apply her open-ended balancing tests with consistency
and transparency. The resulting morass of doctrine led to great uncertainty

177. See Greenhalgh, supra note 120 and accompanying text.
178. See Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, CriticalLegal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 991, 1041-42 (1994).
179. See id.
180. See supra Part III.B-C.
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as to what the law required, especially when the cases were often decided
by Justice O'Connor's completely unpredictable fifth vote.
Justice Scalia has also made the argument that the more the Court
applies open-ending balancing tests and engages in reasoning removed
from the text and history of the U.S. Constitution, the more likely it is that
the confirmation process will select Justices based on their politics rather
than their judicial competence.' Although I do not find his arguments
about history and text persuasive,' 82 he is correct that the more the Court
reaches results that depend on extremely narrow distinctions, the more the
Court becomes politicized. We do not need skilled lawyers to tell us when
abortion restrictions place an "undue burden" on women, or when
religious symbols on government property "endorse" religion too much,
or when official government behavior crosses some impossible to discern
line between "what anyone of normal sensibilities would wish to see
imposed on innocent disabled
citizens,"18 3 versus "conduct... beyond the
184
bounds of human decency.'
Justice O'Connor's "legal" tests are not tests at all, just simply
exercises in deciding each case as if no other case matters. There are
certainly times when issues should be allowed to percolate through the
lower courts and the legislatures.85 But the combination of the frequency
with which Justice O'Connor refused to commit herself (and the Court) to
a clear rule of decision, and her internally and externally inconsistent
application of law to fact, has resulted in a confusing and contradictory
body of law that makes constitutional doctrine in many areas difficult to
understand and impossible to apply. This type of decision making
decreases the possibility of treating similarly situated people similarly, and
leads to the exercise of coercive governmental power in an arbitrary and
capricious fashion. The rule of law, and the American people, deserved
better than that.
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COMMENT. 411,428-430 (1998).
183. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1988).
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V. CONCLUSION

When it came to such important and controversial decisions as
abortion, affirmative action, and the separation of church and state, as well
as numerous other constitutional law cases, Justice O'Connor's decisions
reached inconsistent results and articulated legal standards incapable of
future application. The rule of law requires judges to explain their
decisions in a coherent fashion that provides litigants a fair description of
the result, explains why similar cases are decided differently, and provides
reasonable notice to the public of what to expect in the future. Justice
O'Connor consistently failed to meet these standards in her constitutional
law decisions and thus threatened the rule of law.
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